China's International Broadcasting as a Soft Power Ma(r)ker: Its Market Formation and Audience Making

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1 This paper is submitted to a selected ERCCT paper series and will be uploaded online in due course.
China’s International Broadcasting as a Soft Power Ma(r)ker: Its Market Formation and Audience Making in the Neighborhood

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Abstract

This paper aims to explore China’s ambition to project its soft power via international broadcasting. Using CCTV-9, CCTV’s 24-hour English-language channel as a case study, this research investigates the dynamics of China’s internationalization of its soft power in the neighboring northeast Asian countries of Japan and South Korea as an interactive process of both production and reception. Thus the focus is on the Chinese state’s effort to develop its national image and increase its soft power through the medium of English news as recognized and interpreted by South Korean and Japanese viewers. The dual communicational process is contextually understood with regards to regional and geopolitical trajectories. Overall, this paper illuminates the divergent perception and reception of China’s effort to export its soft power indexed in its embedding in the media markets of Japan and South Korea.

Key words: International broadcasting, CCTV International, soft power, audience

1. Introduction

The extraordinary rise of China has enabled the world not only to pay attention to the emerging country but, conversely, China has started to take consideration of its image inside and especially outside the country. These two currents, “bringing in” (yinjinlai, inward flow), at one end, and “going out” (zouchuqu, outward flow) strategies, at another end, are reflected in China’s policy orientation. The globalized attention given to China is indexed in such phenomena as the rapid increase in the learning of Chinese worldwide, in choosing China as a destination for overseas study, and in trade and tourism between China and other countries. China’s “going out” strategy as the countercurrent flow is targeted on the marketplaces of other countries and the minds of consumers. Using its culture and language China has established 504 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms with the avowed aim of projecting its image to the world (Confucius Institute 2011; Lee 2009).
The media presentation of events plays a significant role in presenting China's image. For example, the epic opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, which was directed by Zhang Yimou, clearly showed China's intention to grandstand its international image. In a similar vein, in January 2011, two Chinese publicity films (Guojia xingxiangpian)—Perspectives (Jiaodu) and People (Renwu)—made by China was released in Times Square in New York (Pan and Zhang 2013; Y Zhao 2011). The release of these two publicity films signaled China's first public (diplomacy) campaign at the state level—a campaign prepared by China's official press agency, the Xinhua News Agency (Xinhuashe), to coincide the release time with President Hu Jintao's state visit to the United States. In March 2012, subsequent to these two “events” (gongguan), “Cultural China (Wenhua Zhongguo),”5 which was produced by CCTV New Technology Animation Channel (Zhongyangdianshitai xinkedongman pindao), was presented to the public also in Time Square in New York City (Shen 2012: 82). The aim in this instance was to project Chinese culture to a broader audience. All told, these publicity (or national image) films resonated with China's effort to reinforce its soft power;6 and they are witness to the fact that the internal reform of the Chinese media system is the crucial platform for Chinese culture and media to “go global,” the rationale being that such domestic reform may facilitate further the export of this genre of media products.

In light of the above, it is readily apparent that carrying out image management through China-produced news media, the Chinese government has been developing a “systemic” approach to establishing regular channels of international communication. For instance, an English version of The Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), which is a daily
newspaper published by the *People’s Daily* (*Renmin Ribao*) is one example. Another is a Chinese-made international news channel in English, China Central Television (CCTV) International. An English-language version of *The Global Times* was launched in April 2009 costing a staggering 45 billion RMB (6.6 billion USD). Given these initiatives, it can be appreciated why, in 2008, President Hu Jintao commanded the news agency “to make the best effort to set CCTV as one of the top-ranking international media. It should possess advanced communication technology, a huge amount of information, extensive coverage, and have a strong media influence.” Responding to this call, the CCTV International channel aimed to spread China’s voice to viewers at home and abroad in several languages. Today CCTV has well and truly entered into this “uncharted territory” by broadcasting in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian, as well as Chinese. The message is clear then: given the aim of improving China’s international image, CCTV International is patently a vehicle of soft power as a part of the county’s state agenda of cultural diplomacy. Using locally produced international broadcasting with the specific aim of reaching foreign audiences, can be understood as an instrument of China’s soft power targeting, as it does, two sets of different audiences: (Overseas) Chinese and foreigners. CCTV 4 is primarily targeted at the ethnic Chinese population around the world, whereas CCTV International’s objective is to reach “a global English-speaking audience, including foreign expatriates working in China” (X Zhang 2011: 62). The overall purpose is clear: for the government it is important how the state-governed media institution represents China and expects this audience to better understand the country and its people. Thus as a means of soft power generation international broadcasting is to play a significant role in enhancing China’s national image.

This paper explores the ways in which one of the state-coordinated media, CCTV, operates as a medium for projecting soft power overseas to reach overseas audiences in

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7 The Chinese version has been published since 1993.
9 In the course of this paper, most of cases, CCTV International refers to CCTV News (formerly, CCTV-9), which is the English broadcasting channel of CCTV. Other language CCTV channels are specified. Along with the English Channel, Chinese, and other language channels of CCTV are named with *Guoji* ("international") in Chinese. Channel names such as CCTV-4 and CCTV-9 are often used in the context.
10 For instance, in Laos, CCTV 1, 4 and 11 are available as of August 2013. The channels are mostly aimed for Chinese workers in the country, according to a foreign researcher who stayed in the country.
South Korea and Japan. Employing China’s ongoing international broadcasting project (CCTV-9) as a case study, the aim is to illuminate how such a market for Chinese-produced international news is constructed and to investigate how South Koreans and Japanese are aware of and consume it. But it should be noted that a textual-cum-discourse analysis of CCTV-9 programs or the organization and management of CCTV-9 channel is not performed in this paper. Rather, the focus is how China’s “image management” via CCTV International reaches external audiences in South Korea and Japan. In particular, it addresses two interconnected questions: How the policy infrastructure and development of CCTV, which can be understood as the Chinese state-agenda of engaging with international broadcasting, are organized, on the one hand? And how such marketplaces and CCTV audiences in South Korea and Japan are structured, on the other hand?

2. International broadcasting as a soft power ma(r)ker

2.1 International broadcasting and soft power: Old wine in a new bottle

This section establishes a relationship between international broadcasting and soft power by offering a brief overview of international broadcasting in general and then moving to consider real cases.

International broadcasting, as explained earlier, aims to reach an overseas audience through broadcasting. International broadcasting has been defined as “a complex combination of state-sponsored news, information, and entertainment directed at a population outside the sponsoring state's boundaries,” as Price et al. argued (Price, Haas, and Margolin 2008). Historically, the development of international broadcasting has had three phases. First, discussions of international broadcasting started in the 1940s and developed in the context of World War II propaganda. Radio and newsreel film show in cinemas were used for propaganda purposes (Garber 1942; Lee 1945) during wartime (Rowe 1939; Berreman 1948). Second, in the post-WWII through to the cold war era and beyond the function and style of international broadcasting was transformed with television becoming the primary medium. Thirdly, today, with the

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11 Earlier works on propaganda are follows: Propaganda in general (Garber 1942; Lee 1945) and War propaganda (Rowe 1939; Berreman 1948).
development of the World Wide Web and the Internet, the way in which international broadcasting is organized and transmitted has changed yet again with online communication beginning to supersede the traditional newsprint media.

Notwithstanding the significant changes to international broadcasting over the three discernible phases of its history from the 20\textsuperscript{th} century to the 21\textsuperscript{st}, as an object of study international broadcasting has only recently regained scholarly attention. In the 2000s academic discussion in the field was largely concentrated on the Western context with special attention afforded included public diplomacy (Cull 2008) and new technology (Price et al. 2008). Very recently, the work of a scholar like Ishi (2011) has mostly focused on the diffusion of international broadcasting within ethnic and language boundaries by exploring the diasporic community 12 and international broadcasting.

Propaganda, on the other hand, is another side of the coin. Brown (2006) delineates two schools of propaganda. First, “the hypnotic, diabolical power of propaganda” type “tends to argue that it can control behavior and manipulate entire populations without their being aware of it, as is the case in Orwell's 1984.” The second, “with its stress on the concrete and definable (and emphasis on the limitations of propaganda as a tool of policy), as a rule is more skeptical about what propaganda can actually achieve and how it has influence” (Brown 2006). Gullion, on the other hand, argues that public diplomacy has elements of propaganda, but it is not equivalent to it (Brown 2008). He implies that propaganda is Janus faced; that is, particular practices of propaganda depend on how explicit, tacit, or implicit the content is and how it is communicated.

Given China’s centralized state, the government’s use of media to reach both internal and external audiences is often situated in the context of propaganda. Shambaugh (2007) has examined China’s propaganda system and Brady and Wang (2009) have discussed the role of propaganda in China as a “Popular Authoritarianism.” China’s propaganda and US national security have been discussed from the US viewpoint. (US-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2009) and Dotson

12 In a related vein, among immigrants or overseas communities, satellite TVs play an important role as a conduit of receiving and keeping up with information and forming communities.
(2011) analyzed China’s propaganda narratives with regard to the revival of Confucianism. And pertinent to the concerns of this paper, Edney (2012) and Youling Liu (2011) have both argued that external communication is tantamount to the dissemination of soft power.

Not surprisingly, however, many of the discussions have largely depended on the American or Western academic literature on international broadcasting (Price et al. 2008). As a result, non-Western channels have been largely ignored in academic debates. But, for the purpose of this research it needs to be emphasized that international broadcasting in a non-Western context simultaneously exists. For example, in the case of East Asia, Japan has a long history with NHK World and South Korea also has Arirang and the KBS World network for the domestic and international audience. In parallel with these instances, attention will now be given to exploring the Chinese case of international broadcasting, CCTV 9.

2.2 Two voices of CCTV in the foreign domain: A case study

There are two strands of CCTV in the academic literature to date. The first strand is on CCTV News (CCTV International), which is mostly written in English; the second strand is on CCTV-4, which is mostly written in Chinese. But CCTV’s foreign language channels have not been well discussed yet. Such a divide in the academic domain may lead to a “perceptual gap” and reflect on the division of an expectant audience. China-based Chinese academics have a tendency to think of CCTV-4 for overseas Chinese (Fan 2013; Y Liu 2007; G Wang 2013). Conversely, foreign-based academics tend to regard CCTV-News as a news channel for English native speakers only. The ethnicized and nationalized focuses of previous studies are understandable but may be misleading as there is the impression that other audiences in other countries, which do not necessarily fall under these two categories, are not important.

The academic writing on Chinese international broadcasting, and on CCTV

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13 I avoid using “racialized” because ethnicity is closer to what I argue here.
14 Previous research on CCTV is as follows: (1) A particular case study on particular programs offers a discourse or framing analysis: Chang and Chen (1998); CCTV Spring Gala’s audience: Twizell (2011); Zhong (2004): CCTV “Dialogue” as a case study]; Ning (2011) and Sim (2007); (2) Newsmaking or journalistic practices: Jirik (2008); Jirik (2009); (3) organization: Kang (2008a); Kang (2008b); Y Liu
particular, can be summarized under the two headings of (1) (historical) development and (2) production. First, understanding CCTV through its historical development, IB and propaganda, the “character” of IB: Some scholars argue that CCTV-9 is an important starting point for China’s international broadcasting (Guo et al. 2004; Paterson and Sreberney 2004). The historical development of CCTV’s international channel has been explored (Xiaoling Zhang 2011). Brady posits CCTV-9 in the context of expanding China’s foreign propaganda media organizations (Brady 2008: 166-167). Along with China’s engagement in Africa, Fan (2013) explores the strategy of localization of CCTV-News in Africa (Y Fan 2013).

Second, understanding CCTV through its production: From news-making, news-reporting to soft power: Ying Zhu’s book, entitled Two Billion Eyes: The Story of China Central Television, was written based on interviews with journalists with the aim of understand how CCTV programs for domestic subscribers are made. Jirik (2008) studied the news-making process of CCTV reporters and producers regarding the issue of deciding and sorting out newsworthy values. Newsroom practices (Jirik 2008; Ning 2011) and news report strategies of CCTV (Lin 2003) have also discussed from journalism perspectives. Whereas these above-mentioned studies investigated journalistic practices, Jirik noted that the CCTV-9 and transnational broadcasting are a significant change/addition to the original set-up of CCTV. However, the author did not

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explicitly highlight CCTV’s launch of its 24-hour global English Channel, CCTV-9, as contributing to China’s effort to expand its soft power.

However, the recently edited volume *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication* (Wang 2011) does discuss China’s endeavors to enhance its soft power. The diverse range of chapters presented in the edited volume cover China’s endeavor to implement soft power, CCTV International, the national image, the Beijing Summer Olympics, and corporate diplomacy in Africa. All of the contributions are concerned with public diplomacy vis-à-vis China’s management of its national image. These scholars emphasize the important role of CCTV, or often CCTV’s international channel, i.e., CCTV-9, plays in informing others about China and delivering China’s image through the channel, but these researchers did not examine responses to CCTV from non-Chinese perspectives. The studies not only do not deal with audience responses, but they also have a limited geographical focus, only available in China, or to overseas Chinese societies. Methodologically speaking, the chapters in *Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication* assume a unidirectional approach.

In terms of target audience,

> despite the fact that among the channel itself, the recognition of CCTV-9’s targeted audience varies largely, according to one of the reporters, it mainly consist of three categories of viewership: Our primary audience are the English-speaking countries, the U.S. and Europe as the opinion-makers in these countries are the people that monitor our programs. Secondly, are the Asian African countries; but our de facto audience, which is also the largest group, are the English speakers in China, which we are aware of. Also, we have the foreigners stationed in China (Ning 2011: 3).

“CCTV News can be received in 97 countries with nearly 100 million viewers worldwide (CCTV 2010c).” As such, the Chinese state expects to consider its viewers by reflecting on the penetration rate; however, the real number of overseas *de facto* viewers that exists is still unknown and may not be consistent with China’s apparent figure.

Against this brief summary of the scholarly literature on international public service broadcasting in China this paper aims to contribute to the academic study of soft
power and international broadcasting by exploring the intersections between consuming, watching, and receiving between senders and recipients. In conceptual terms, soft power is used as a framework for understanding the mechanism of international broadcasting from the sender’s and recipients’ perspectives to embrace this practice linked to the nation-state’s agenda. The aim of this paper is not to only to explore whether the soft power agent, the Chinese government, has soft power or not, but to illuminate the ways in which the process works and is embedded in domestic institutional settings.

3. The “China brand broadcasting” development

3.1 Making CCTV as a soft power generator: Policy and institutional arrangements

Policing and placing CCTV into a series of policy

As argued earlier, to enhance Chinese (cultural) soft power through exporting Chinese culture and media, the Chinese government emphasizes exporting cultural products and services. One way this is done is to use commercialized Chinese TV series and films (Lee 2012b); another way is to use international broadcasting with a more explicit aim of connecting with an external audience (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. China’s Soft Power Projection Plan: “Going out” and “Entering in” Policies through Outward and Inward Development

Source: Compiled and created by the author

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16 *Hanban* is the Chinese Language Council.
Figure 2. The Organizational Chart: Institutions
Source: Complied and generated by the author

Figure 3. The Structure of China’s Television System
Source: Marianne Friese Consulting 2007: 2

17 The full name of “Information Office” should be “The State Council Information Office.” “Department of Propaganda” should be “The Central Propaganda Department.”
CCTV management: Institutions

CCTV, the central TV station, is managed by two entities. CCTV is under the direction of the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), along with China National Radio (CNR), and China Radio International (CRI). The Department of Propaganda, on the other hand, also controls CCTV as well as other state-owned media players (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). Thus the institutional settings of SARFT and the Department of Propaganda are important in CCTV foreign language channels’ infrastructure.

3.2 Infrastructuring the channels: Centers, bureaus, and networks

Global centers (overseas centers) are in charge of the international (overseas) broadcasting of CCTV. “The center is a programming department the main tasks of which are the following: CCTV’s international broadcasting; channels in Chinese, English, Spanish, and French; producing programs which are scheduled for broadcast overseas and programming such programs; producing and broadcasting mega-events programs; offering and sending Chinese and foreign language TV programs to Chinese diplomats, embassies, overseas-located TV stations; “external communication (propaganda)” of TV programs in local TV stations and international cooperation (Z Lin 2010).”

On December 28, 2009, CCTV formally launched China CNTV as a public service
platform with the aim of internationalization using multiple languages and multiple terminals (equipment). Four days later, the China Xinhua news TV network was launched. On January 1, 2010, the network started satellite broadcasting.

In 2010, CCTV spurred continuous development in the international broadcasting market. CCTV intermittently established broadcast centers (transmitting development centers) overseas. The channel also planned to center on CCTV-9 channels by the end of 2010, and the number of overseas dispatch bureaus reached around 50, along with establishing of 7 centers (Namgung and Song 2010). As part of additional ongoing establishment a new channel, CCTV-P, the Portuguese channel, is expected to be launched in the near future. It is reasonable to speculate that the Chinese government is likely to use the colonial history between Macau and Portugal as integral to the identity of the new channel (CCTV 2009d).

CCTV has numerous bureaus to collect news and report from Asia to Africa (see Table 1). In the Asia-Pacific, bureaus are located in Australia, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, Thailand, Japan, and India. In Europe there are bureaus in Belgium, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. London and Washington, D.C., bureaus have 12 reporters each, more than in any other bureaus. However, these worldwide bureaus demonstrate a more or less even distribution in terms of regions. It is also noted that this information does not correspond with the exact number of the launches of different foreign language channels in CCTV International initiatives. In addition, the channel is dedicated to establishing 70 more bureaus on a global stage to collect news and report in 2011.

Table 1. CCTV’s foreign correspondents in global bureaus
Source: CCTV (n.d.) and modified from X Zhang 2011: 59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>No of reporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia (17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium (EU)</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Developing CCTV International channels

3.3.1 CCTV International: From “Your window on China and the world” to “Your link to Asia”

CCTV-9 (now CCTV News), with the slogan “China’s First English News Channel,” was launched on September 15, 2000. The name of the Channel was changed to CCTV News on April 24, 2010. It provides news and information on China to a global audience. The channel has 45 million subscribers outside of China, according to CCTV International Overview. Furthermore, “The English website is now handled by China Network Television (CNTV), a web-streaming service of CCTV (Wikipedia).” A recent development offers CCTV-9 to introduce two documentary channels.

The channel has three broadcasting centers: Beijing, Nairobi (in October 2012), and Washington, D.C. (in November 2012) (Financial Times 2011; Kookmin Ilbo 2011). Along with CCTV International’s relaunch as CCTV News in April 2010, the channel aimed to bolster its news-gathering abilities while voicing more perspectives from China and Asia to the world (CCTV 2010b). Also, CCTV Africa was launched in Kenya.

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19 There is no alternative source on this information to the best of my knowledge. That is why I had to use such a source.
20 CCTV's slogan to “Your Link to Asia” can be an important reference point to ponder about. Perspectives “within” Asia, where inherently has a huge audience. Thus, it would be about bringing the perspective of a “Chinese Asia” to the rest of Asia. This line of view is neglected in the previous scholarly and media discourse. This will be revisited in my future research.
on January 11, 2012, and CCTV America began broadcasting on February 6, 2012. Dubai (CCTV Middle East), Sao Paulo (CCTV Latin America), and Moscow (CCTV Russia) have been selected for global studios (CCTV 2012). In the meantime, unlike other cases of CCTV International News launches, which are mostly on regional hubs, CCTV News was launched in Sri Lanka in 2010. The fact that Sri Lanka was chosen as one of the places to site CCTV News enables us to see that there is an increase in launching news satellites dishes or networks of CCTV News in general around the globe.

3.3.2 Non-English channels: Reaching diverse audiences

CCTV 4 (now known as CCTV4 Chinese International [Zhongwen guoji]), CCTV International in Mandarin, is the oldest among a series of CCTV International channels with an initial launch on October 1, 1992 (Y Liu 2007: 69). It was established with a target audience primarily of overseas Chinese and “those who are interested in China” (Brady 2008: 167). An overall reform of the International Chinese Channel of CCTV (CCTV-4) took place in January 2006. Accordingly, on the basis of the reform, CCTV-4 started to broadcast its programs to Asia, Europe, and America (Y Liu 2007: 69). It then had a substantial change and the channel was reestablished under the slogan of “Transmitting Chinese civilization, Servicing overseas Chinese” (Chuancheng Zhonghua wenming, fuwu quanqiu huaren) (Y Liu 2007: 70). Such an expansion of reaching out to different audiences, also highlights the channel’s engagement with America, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese mass media (G Wang 2013). CCTV-4 has reached 15 million households (Y Liu 2007: 70; M Kang 2008: 28). On mainland China, CCTV-4 is the channel which has the broadest range of coverage (Y Liu 2007: 70). The recent 2012 statistics show that 171 countries have CCTV-4 channel coverage and 52 million overseas subscribers, CCTV-4, confirming that became many overseas audience would choose a TV channel in Chinese (G Wang 2013: 22).

Influencing others by the Chinese media and shifting public opinion in the international arena, CCTV channels in foreign languages were established. CCTV E & F, the Spanish and French channels, respectively, were launched on October 1, 2004. Three

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21 CCTV 4 was renamed as CCTV4 Chinese International (Zhongwen guoji) since 2011.
16 years later, on October 1, 2007, they were relaunched as two separate channels: CCTV E, the Spanish channel and CCTV F, the French channel. In 2009, when the CCTV news channel was restructured, the CCTV Arabic and CCTV Russian channels were launched. With an aim of reaching 300 million people in 22 Arab countries and bridging to strengthen communication and understanding between China and these countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region, the CCTV International Arabic channel was launched on July 25, 2009 (CCTV 2009a). Celebrating the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Russia, CCTV International Russia was launched on September 10, 2009 (CCTV 2009b). Thus, within three years, up to 2012, CCTV’s international development embraced 7 more languages and 11 more channels.

3.4 The “local” reception of CCTV International and CCTV-4
CCTV’s numerous channels have some core programs in common but also their own programming targeted on regional audiences and specific language communities. On a regional basis, CCTV-4 in Asia, Europe, and Americas have different versions of programming, and prime time zones are different from region to region. It is surprising then that some scholars have argued that CCTV International is only for English native speakers. But this is a myopic view as with both centralized and decentralized programs repertoires the many channel actually target a wide range of audiences worldwide. Added to this is the fact that after the expansion and upgrading (kuoban) of the channel continued apace it was clear that a differentiated broadcasting strategy has been implemented (Y Liu 2007: 71).

Manufacturing the “quasi-(semi-)” local audience
A local Chinese audience trend can be found from weekly audience ratings and trends of the CCTV-News English Channel for 2011. The rating of 2011 is basically consistent with that of 2010. The sixth week and twelfth weeks of the audience rating showed almost the same results as each other, are the highest in 2011. The audience rating of the CCTV-News English Channel was stable for each day from morning to evening. The audience rating of a time zone between 7 pm to 8 pm is slightly higher than times such as morning and afternoon (2012 China Radio & TV Yearbook 2012: 275).
Reaching and engaging with the Taiwanese audience is another important task of CCTV-4. The position of Taiwan in the Chinese industrial sectors is rather peculiar due to its relation with China. Similarly, the Channel also reflects such a special treatment (Lee 2012a; Lee 2012c). The annual Yearbooks of CCTV and the China Radio & TV Yearbooks indicate that CCTV-4 for and in Taiwan has its own customized programs. For example, TV dramas in Hokkien, which were firstly made by the CCTV international broadcasting center (CCTV haiwai chuanbo zhongxin), were broadcasted in 2011 (2012 China Radio & TV Yearbook, 2012: 47). Information on local and Taiwanese audiences is the only data available\(^\text{22}\); but corresponding information on other types of audiences is not publically available.

In line with former President Hu Jintao’s letter celebrating the 50\(^\text{th}\) year of the inauguration of CCTV, “Transforming CCTV as the first-class international media which has a strong influence with an advanced technology, information, and a broader coverage (of audience) (Hu 2008 in Li and Wu 2008).” Thus, CCTV’s aim is to develop

\(^{22}\) One of the biggest audience rating company in China, CSM, even does not release such a data, not the company has collected this so far.
and build the best TV station and media in the world (Z Lin 2010: 53). Similarly, Jiang Zemin at the same event promulgated: “Make CCTV an influential news media at the world level (Jiang 2008 in Li and Wu 2008).” Reflecting on this circumstance, this part of the paper broadens the understanding of a “diverse” range of a possible CCTV audiences.

3.5 Producing CCTV’s internet platform: CNTV

As a national web-based TV broadcaster officially launched on December 28, 2009, China Network Television (CNTV) provides users with a globalized, multilingual, and multi-terminal public webcast service platform (Wikipedia). CNTV International offers five foreign language services (English, French, Spanish, Russian, and Arabic). Not only CNTV International offers the United Nations language, six local language services (Chinese, Mongolian in Mongol Script, Tibetan, Kazakh, Uyghur, and Chaoxian language) are also offered in tandem with CNTV (see Figure 5). They also provide “viewers with a host of news and feature programs from China National Television’s foreign channels (Wikipedia).”

![Figure 5. China Network Television: Ethnic and Foreign Language Services](image)

Source: CNTV (n.d.)

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23 However, it is acknowledged that my own fieldwork data may not be “comprehensive,” as the research was conducted by a single researcher.

24 Chaoxian language (chosun) is a language which is spoken by ethnic Koreans in China. This is a variation of Korean language and slightly different from Korean language.
CNTV, CCTV Internet broadcasting, recently advertised to recruit Korean announcers for the CNTV Korean channel. This CNTV Korean channel is commissioned and managed by the Heilongjiang Newspaper, a Korean-Chinese media investment, in Ha’erbin (WRDP 2012). Given that the CNTV Korean channel is associated with the Korean-Chinese media, it is important to note that foreign nationals are planned to be hired rather than finding Korean-Chinese with Chinese nationality. The target audience is South Korean netizens and Koreans overseas. The following are expected as the target and chief users: The main Korean users will be high-ranking officials, research institutes, Chinese international students in Korea, and Korean-Chinese in Korea. The main China-based users are expected to be Koreans and Korean international students in China, Chinese who learn Korean, and Korean-Chinese. Two phases have been outlined. In the first phase, CCTV news and documentaries in Chinese will be translated and broadcast in Korean. In the second phase, after the successful establishment of this station taken place, the Korean broadcasting station will establish a studio in Korea to self-produce programs.

4. Managing global markets and manufacturing responses in South Korea and Japan
The previous section examined the development contours of CCTV by setting up worldwide bureaus and dispatching and recruiting Chinese and foreign nationals. Drawing these issues together, in what follows how the external (trans-local) market of China’s international broadcasting is constructed in South Korea and Japan is discussed.

4.1 Creating “global” CCTV markets: Process and marketplaces
Exploring overseas marketplaces of CCTV, we need to look at how it is formed and locates itself in the international market. The processes of how the CCTV channels are imported and thus how marketplaces are constructed can be explained as follows.

The official route: Many Chinese TV products are sold and exported officially through a state-owned enterprise called China International (Zhongguo guoji yingshi zonggongsi). More importantly, this serves as an agent of (marketing) CCTV program copyrights. This is the only agent for doing overseas market selling among alliances of exportation of Chinese TV programs (M Kang 2008b: 30). And it is the only company in China which is authorized by the Chinese government to do agent to conduct business with foreign satellite programs. It also owns introducing TV programs (M Kang 2008b: 30).

The satellite: In the case of opening-up CCTV channels overseas, using a satellite is the usual route. In this regard, China Great Wall Satellite TV (Zhongguo Changcheng Weixing TV), which has North America, Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America bureaus, play an important role in spreading the channels. Also, “Chinese channel, English channel, Spanish and French channels are transmitted via satellite to 120 countries in North and South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific (M Kang 2008b: 28).”

25 Zhongguo guoji yingshi zonggongsi. Retrieved August 4, 2013 (http://www.citvc.com/). The former name was Zhongguo guoji dianshi zong gongsi (CITVC, established in 1984). This company is a state-owned company which is fully invested by CCTV. It was established in 1984. After experiencing structuring on capital and organizations, it further develops itself. It is now the biggest and the most profitable media company in China (M Kang 2008b: 30).

26 Doipkwon in Korean.
An implicit mechanism: An explicit mechanism of bringing CCTV into South Korea and Japan remains unknown. Reflecting on the manner in which foreign broadcasters, such as BBC, CNN, NHK, are available in these countries, “CCTV is also transmitted as a linear type,” a Korean media professional responded. In a related vein, Lin (2010: 53) also indicated that CCTV-4, CCTV-9, Spanish, French, and Arabic channels are transmitted via satellite. Through cable networks, satellite TV, terrestrial TV, IPTV, and broadband internet, more than 100 countries and hotels have CCTV channels.

Locations of channels
The availability of the CCTV channel in the South Korean and Japanese markets must be closely examined. Unlike Japan, with the satellite dish company Skylife, in South Korea, CCTV-4 is shown in Chinese. More importantly, cable TV providers, such as CJ Hello Vision and Tbroad in South Korea have CCTV News channels as part of their package options. In addition, IPTV, a new broadcaster, has SK Telecom (B TV), KT (QOOK TV), and LG (U plus). In Japan, Sky Perfect TV (Skapa) and Hikari TV offer CCTV subscription services. Eo-net has Channel 783 for a 24-hour CCTV channel (Chugoku terebi CCTV Daihu) with simultaneous translation of Japanese, as an optional channel, which costs 19 USD per month (Eonet n.d.). This amount of money is considerably reasonable to potential subscribers compared to other optional channels (which are equally available in South Korea).

Table 2. The location of CCTV-9 in the South Korean and Japanese markets
Source: Compiled by the author. Eonet n.d. and SATCH n.d. provide some sources of the Japan data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CCTV4</th>
<th>Established date</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1992</td>
<td>Satellite: Skylife (Channel 527)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV News</td>
<td>CJ Hello Vision</td>
<td>Skapa: Ch 783, Ch 568, Hikari TV Ch 180, Eo Hikari Terebi Ch 783.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tbroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Interview with a Korean media professional, November 2011, Seoul, South Korea; Interview with a Korean media professional, Singapore, November 30, 2012.

28 As of May 2013, 1890 yen is converted into 19 USD. However, due to a recent decrease in Japanese Yen, it may slightly underrepresent the value. In Japanese cable TV market, each channel which ranges from 480 JPY to 3150 JPY per month is optional to be added on top of the basic program package.
As documented in Table 2, the availability of CCTV-9 in these two South Korea and Japan is not apparent. Although the information in Table 7.2 may not be exhaustive, “translocal” domestic institutions in these countries (un)consciously control how many channels and where to import and what to import in their local broadcasting markets. In this vein, Japan’s use/implementation of optional channels shows the country’s commercial and market logic. The aim of CCTV Daifu, the Japanese agent of CCTV, is “to provide information about the latest culture and current affairs for Chinese who live in Japan, at the same time, to make Japanese better understand China and Chinese, and further, to establish Japan and China’s friendly relationship (Daifu n.d.).” In the case of Tbroad in South Korea, this channel is not optional but part of a package. The number of Tbroad subscribers does not mean that the same people actually consume and watch this particular channel.

In the Japanese market, CCTV is not a mainstream channel in the sense that the informants as well as ordinary Japanese people do not show their interest or enthusiasm in other countries. In addition, there are structural factors for Japanese market players and potential consumers to import foreign channels.29 This inherent barrier functions as a self-regulation of such channels. On the other hand, in the Korean market, when the local barriers are taken as trade-related issues including the Republic of Korea (ROK)-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) text (Long and Lee forthcoming) and ROK-China FTA preparation text,30 there are written practices and regulations on the importation of foreign programs and channels. In contrast to this trade view, another reason why entry barriers of foreign satellite broadcasting channels are high in Korea is due to a “cultural imperial thesis.” In 2000, there is not a single foreign satellite channel is officially recognized in Korea; in the future, the limited number of foreign channels

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29 For a further discussion and similar findings on different types of the commodities, see Lee 2012b.
30 For a detailed discussion on the preparation meeting of the Korea-China FTA, see Lee 2012b.
should be specified by the Korean Broadcasting Commissions (Song and Lee 2000). At the time of writing, foreign satellite channels can be available through Program Providers or Cable Television packages. The locally embedded market structure and barriers play an important role in making and unmaking audiences of such channels in South Korea and Japan.

4.2 Crafting CCTV-9 viewers\textsuperscript{31} in South Korea and Japan: In pursuit of audiences

In all likelihood, the location of CCTV International in these two markets does not seem to be in stark contrast. CCTV International’s reach of audiences under such similar conditions in South Korea and Japan provides a solid ground for seeking audiences.

4.2.1 Between not knowing and knowing: Who knows about it

A Japanese informant, JV42,\textsuperscript{32} a student of Tokyo University, replied to an interview question whether he had experienced watching CCTV, “CCTV? I’ve never heard of it. Can I watch it in Japan?” The informant did not know about whether, where, and how he could watch CCTV in his country. JV35,\textsuperscript{33} similar to other Japanese respondents, said, “I know about CCTV, but do not know that foreign language channels exist.”

4.2.2 Of not knowing and not intending to watch

In contrast to these responses from Japanese informants, the Korean interviewees consistently indicated that they at least are aware of the existence of the network. Some of them were even recognized that the channel is available in South Korea. KV3\textsuperscript{34} said, “I know CCTV is available to watch in South Korea.” In addition, KV41\textsuperscript{35} said, “I know there

\textsuperscript{31} The informants in South Korea and Japan in my fieldwork are mostly in their 20s and 30s. They were enrolled in or had graduated from a university (or above). This is common, in the case of Korea, in particular, as more than XX percent of high school graduates go to university. According to The Social Indicators of South Korea 2012, which is released by Statistics Korea (the Statistical Bureau of Korea) in 2013, the country has 79 percent of college entrance rate in 2010. The rate was 82.1 percent in 2005 and 68 percent in 2000.

\textsuperscript{32} Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 27, 2012, Tokyo, Japan.

\textsuperscript{33} Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 23, 2012, Tokyo, Japan.

\textsuperscript{34} Interview with a Korean respondent, November 27, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.

\textsuperscript{35} Interview with a Korean respondent, December 21, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
is an English channel.”  

However, when the interviewees were asked whether they would be willing to watch this channel in the near future, the responses varied. The first type was flagged by unwillingness to watch the channel. KV1\(^{37}\) explained, “For me, there are two reasons for watching programs in Chinese. One is only for my interest. Another is because of language learning itself. I do not find any reason to watch Chinese channels which are broadcasted in another language other than Chinese.” In a similar vein KV16\(^{38}\) said, “I don’t have any intention to watch it. I watch Chinese programs to enhance my Chinese language ability not to learn English.” A Japanese informant, JV36\(^{39}\) repeated the same view: “I’ve watched CCTV, but not the foreign language channels.” KV24\(^{40}\) strongly expressed her opinion: “Why should I watch other language channels when I watch China’s CCTV?”

The second type was due to language competence. KV9\(^{41}\) who did not know about CCTV International, said, “I understand Chinese. That’s why it gives me joy to watch channels in Chinese. Yet, due to my poor English capacity, I rather stick to watch the Chinese version. It is certainly difficult for me to understand English.” Reflecting on her response, the following conclusion can be drawn: A non-viewer of CCTV International assumes that other CCTV channels of CCTV in Chinese offer the same programs in English on CCTV International. The interview questions were not directly phrased to use soft power and government oversight at any point was because of not giving any idea or imposing on certain preconceptions.\(^{42}\) Thus it was apparent that she did not think that China used this channel as part of public diplomacy and soft power as an image enhancer. The manner in which audiences do not understand the logic may be

\(^{36}\) It could be dependent on when they were in China or having such information before or after their arrival in China.

\(^{37}\) Interview with a Korean respondent, November 19, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.

\(^{38}\) Interview with a Korean respondent, December 9, 2011, Seoul, Seoul, South Korea.

\(^{39}\) Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 23, 2012, Tokyo, Japan.

\(^{40}\) Interview with a Korean respondent, December 9, Seoul, South Korea.

\(^{41}\) Interview with a Korean respondent, November 30, Seoul, South Korea.

\(^{42}\) I am not arguing that soft power only be used in foreign language broadcasting, or more broadly international broadcasting. As represented in Figure 1, China’s soft power plan has a broader scope of such efforts. Also, international broadcasting in Chinese language (CCTV-4) is certainly such a tool of projecting Chinese news and soft power which has been not well addressed in this relation in scholarly works.
problematic or beneficial to the Chinese authority can be intriguing.

KV10, who learned Chinese and Arabic, said, “I know CCTV has English and Arabic channels. On cable TV channels at home I was so excited to get to know that . . . be able to watch CCTV. I have missed Chinese language programs since I came back from China. In my first encounter, I thought it is in Chinese, which is CCTV1, the Chinese news channel, but I happen to listen to English.” She anticipated the Chinese channel was because she was not aware of the availability of CCTV channel broadcasting in English in South Korea, although she knew about such existence of the channel in general. In line with responses from KV16 and JV36, KV10 does show her intention to watch the English Channel. All in all, in their mind, CCTV should be in Chinese and other language channels of CCTV are not the primary reason for them to watch CCTV.

4.2.3 Willingness to be exposed

Unlike previous responses regarding reluctance to consume the channel, other informants expected and assumed that CCTV International would provide a broad open view of China and the world. That is in part because they know that the channel is provided by the Chinese government. Foreign viewers assume that a Chinese government news channel which is not in Chinese would give them “a broad open view of the world.” They expect a foreign language could deliver less biased views than information that the state media would provide in general. Simultaneously, they also know that CCTV as well as other Chinese media in general gives an impression for Koreans and Japanese that they are state-coordinated media.47

KV15, a female student, has “an intention to watch international channels. I can know about and listen to China in English.” KV6 said, “I am willing to watch such an English channel. By watching it, I think I could have more chances to know about

43 Interview with a Korean respondent, December 5, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
44 Interview with a Korean respondent, December 9, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
46 Interview with a Korean respondent, December 5, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
47 In a similar vein, see Lee (2013c).
48 Interview with a Korean respondent, Seoul, South Korea.
49 Interview with a Korean respondent, Seoul, South Korea.
China and the world. On top of that, I can listen to English.” In a related vein, KV28\(^{50}\) said, “I want to watch such a channel for a better understanding of China and language learning.” These responses indicate that the media, for them, do not exist in their own right. Moreover, CCTV, in this case, is a channel for studying English or Chinese. As such, it is indeed a case of “killing two birds with one stone.”

4.2.4 Consuming

The above accounts concur to a degree in shared understanding and regarding consumption behavior. In contrast, the following stories from Japan and South Korea in the consumption sphere illustrate rather different attitudes. In the Japanese market, CCTV is “regulated” by a local media player to give the specific impression that the channel is not available outside the country. It is noted that in the case of Japan, the Japanese informants do not usually watch the channel online via the Internet; thus, all responses are from their consuming patterns and experiences on television. JV42\(^{51}\) said, “I watched CCTV as part of the NHK news. On the NHK news, there is a corner that shows overseas TV network abridged news. Except for that, I did not watch CCTV at all. KBS, YTN, and CNN news have streaming websites. I often watch them through them. I don't know about CCTV, whether it has such a function.” JV57\(^{52}\) responded, “On a morning NHK world news program on BS 1, I watched CCTV. The news program has Chinese, Korean, which is KBS, Aljazeera, Spanish, French, German, and American TV news which are broadcast in Japan for about 5-10 minutes.” He continued, “There is a place to watch such programs on campus. I am not sure how many people are interested in and are willing to watch them.” Both of the two Japanese respondents shared the same opinion that CCTV was watched as a nested program of their own national TV network. Coupled with this arrangement, domestic institutions play an interesting and important role in shaping local people’s ideas and behavior. Along with the domestic institution's control by selecting certain channels to import in the market, this offers another role for the domestic institution in the sending country's soft power making.

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\(^{50}\) Interview with a Korean respondent, Seoul, South Korea.
\(^{51}\) Interview with a Japanese respondent, April 25, 2012, Tokyo, Japan.
\(^{52}\) Interview with a Japanese respondent, May 24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan.
In the Korean media market, CCTV International, contrary to the case of Japan, is clearly recognized by viewers and non-viewers. However, their understanding of the channel is not unified. KV21 said, “I watched some of the programs of CCTV International. I am more than happy to watch again. It’s more open than other Chinese channels, and offers an international perspective. It has many international contents. I’m sure I can learn more about China through this.” In a similar vein, KV26, a male student, said, “I think through watching the international channel I can receive many kinds of international information.” There are certain levels of assumptions of the expected nature of this channel. However, KV7, who had worked in China as a Korean language teacher for two years, had opportunities to watch the Arabic channel. Her response contradicted the explicit aim of these CCTV channels made by China. She said, “The Arabic channel is meant for China’s minority Uyghur minority, which is what I heard from my Chinese co-worker.” The piece of misinformation came from her Chinese colleague, who taught Chinese to foreigners. Whether the information is known as a fact to the colleague or is an unknown fact for the Chinese colleague of KV7 is not specified. However, KV7 was not aware of the difference between Uyghur and the Arabic-speaking community and language. Conversely, Uyghurs do not speak Arabic and Uyghur is a Turkic language not a Semitic language. In that regard, information from the local people may not be straightforward at all.

Noticeably, two programs of CCTV-News were the most frequently mentioned over the course of interviews. “Culture Express" features a selection Chinese cultural news and international events. “Dialogue“ is a daily talk show on current affairs at prime time. It has a mixture of foreign and Chinese guests on various topics. It also states that “it reaches over 80 million subscribers around the world.”

For most informants in South Korea and Japan, CCTV International did not leave

53 Interview with a Korean respondent, December 9, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
54 Interview with a Korean respondent, December 9, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
55 Interview with a Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
56 Interview with a Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
57 Interview with a Korean respondent, November 29, 2011, Seoul, South Korea.
impressions of China’s views on China and the world; conversely, propaganda or external publicity characteristics were not conveyed to this audience, because the channel is in English, not in their local languages. The Korean-Chinese (Chaoxian, chosun) language, which is used by the Korean ethnic minority who live in China, is a variation of the Korean language in South Korea. Due to this complex ethnic relation, Korean is likely to be seen as a language of one of the Chinese minorities, rather than as a language of a foreign neighboring country. The advertisement of recruiting Korean announcers at CNTV, as mentioned earlier, shows an ambivalent attitude on the way in which Korean and Chinese are intertwined.

To revisit the gist of this paper’s finding, Figure 6 presents typologies of the dynamics of managing and (un)making audiences in these countries (see Figure 6). First, indifferent: those who have no interest in China-produced programs; therefore, they do not watch them at all. Second, transient: they are aware that it exists; however, they do not continue to keep interests in watching them. Third, simply experiencing it: they often watch the programs; but, it may not be a long-term investment for them. Accordingly, they do not necessarily have an interest in such channels. Last, a devotees, which is the most ideal one from the Chinese state’s perspective, are those viewers who have a great interest in the channels as well as China. Thus, they are likely to continue to watch them. Such engagement, in turn, may also be translated into other related matters such as travel, language learning, and studying abroad.

Figure 6. Situating knowledge and consumption: Dynamics of viewers in South Korea and Japan
Source: Generated by the author
In a nutshell, CCTV International is perceived and understood in diverse ways: From attentive recipients' point of view the interests are learning more about China and the Chinese language (Mandarin), learning about international current affairs, and providing a better platform for minorities to know about China and to be exposed to local Chinese news. On the other hand, for agnostic informants, CCTV International is not for learning about the world via English and other foreign languages which are used in the CCTV project, but for learning about China in Mandarin or learning Mandarin. The spectrum of responses to CCTV International shows clearly that the interest in and attraction to this channel varies considerably.

5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to consider international broadcasting as a soft power facilitator or as a potential direct mediator of soft power through an examination of the reception of CCTV-9 in South Korea and Japan. The main findings are as follows: First, the Chinese government’s strategy of using CCTV-9 as a means of soft power at the policy level may not be fully transformed at the level of practice level in another country. This finding is in line with the assertion that “it is difficult for the Chinese media to win over foreign audiences in a timely fashion, especially regarding perceived sensitive
issues by the government (Zhang 2011: 203). In this regard, China’s soft power is certainly an invisible form that has the potential to change the audience’s views, bearing in mind that the mechanism of international broadcasting is not singular but contingent on the recipients’ domestic settings—both marketplaces and consumption spheres, and their national and individual characteristics.

Second, there is a marked difference in the embedding of CCVT-9 in South Korea and Japan and in the audience response to it. Given that these countries are not English-speaking, although enrolment in Chinese language classes is increasing, exposure to CCVT-9 is limited and provides two different strands. Whereas the Korean and Japanese viewers did not recognize the Chinese state’s impetus of CCTV as an image enhancer, ordinary Japanese did not know about CCTV. Koreans tended to emphasize that CCTV is a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party and did not think CCTV International is comparable in quality, interest, and fidelity as the BBC and CNN. However, the Japanese learned about CCTV through their own national broadcasting station (NHK) namely, NHK World News. This limitation is in tandem with implicit Japanese regulation of the channel as well as less willingness to acknowledge China as a global Chinese hegemon in statu nascendi. On the whole, the Korean respondents were better informed and aware than the Japanese.

Regarding future research, the following observations should be noted. First, at the ideological-cultural level the local media’s representation of China in Japan and South Korea, for instance, cannot but shape the respective audiences views on China and so influence their willingness or openness to watch such a channel. The reasons for this no doubt lies in the interconnection and disconnection of China and the two other

60 However, it is noted that Zhang argues in the context of news coverage and reporting of Sichuan earthquake in 2008 and the Tibetan Riots in the same year as well as the Beijing Olympic torch relay.
61 This is in line with arguments of the following two papers. Under the big umbrella of China’s FDI policies in telecom services and media sectors, related views were offered in Lee’s papers (Lee 2012a; 2012b). The Chinese government’s reluctance to embrace foreign capital in the Chinese market is in part because newspapers and television are traditionally regarded as the representative of the Chinese Communist Party. They are not only a means of providing information, but they also provide citizens with political and ideological education. For more detailed information, see Lee (2012a) and Lee (2012b).
62 It is surprising that China’s expenditure on CCTV America exceeds that of BBC by more than 19 times. Although China as a latecomer puts much effort and money into this project, the channel does not necessarily have the prestige or reach or renown of the BBC yet. It needs still far away to go further. In relation to this, see Wedge Infinity (2013).
Northeast Asian countries. The distinction between interconnection and disconnection is a dual metaphor that not only emphasizes the relations between nation-states; it also includes the individual level of (dis)connectedness as well as the aggregated societal responses.

Second, at the reception level, future research is likely to show different patterns of response between differing viewing generations and constituencies across the two societies. This especially applies to young urban Korean and Japanese informants in their 20s and 30s who visited, studied, or worked in China in the mid-2000s and 2010s. In this connection, future research needs to inquire further into whether or not the individual responses of informants are based on the actual experience of watching international broadcasting because they worked or studied in China.63

Thirdly, and finally at the methodological level it should be noted that, in the field of the study of international broadcasting, previous researchers have tended to divorce theory from empirical data (Fan 1995). Put another way, regarding the research privileged in this paper, theory on international broadcasting and soft power is not always supported, if at all, by empirical evidence. In contrast, this paper has most certainly endeavored to link theory and description to data and it is proffered that the findings of this research provide insights for research on the mediated relations between international broadcasting and soft power.

References


63 There is available information from the author's field work data. 28 Korean informants either visited China or stayed (studied or worked) in China; whereas 16 Japanese informants either visited China or stayed in China.


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