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Party and Party System Institutionalization Following Democratization: Comparing South Korea and Taiwan

(Mark Weatherall)

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Party and Party System Institutionalization Following Democratization: Comparing South Korea and Taiwan

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Background

This study is based on the belief, widely accepted in the literature, that party and party system institutionalization is important for democracy, and the desire to fill a gap in research on party and party system institutionalization in Asia by examining East Asia’s two third wave democracies – Taiwan and South Korea. The study distinguishes between two related, but analytically distinct concepts – party system institutionalization and party institutionalization. As these concepts are analytically distinct, we explore each one separately.

In recent years, there has been an upsurge in scholarly interest in the relationship between party and party system institutionalization and the consolidation and quality of democracy (see for example, Birch, 2001; Foweraker, 1998; Diamond and Gunther, 2001; Kohli, 1992; Diamandouros and Gunther, 2001; Kostelecký, 2002; Kitschelt, 2007; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring, 1999; Morlino, 1995). While much of this literature focused on party system institutionalization as an independent variable, more recently, scholars have also attempted to establish the causal factors which account for variation in party system institutionalization as the dependent variable (Tavits, 2005; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Geddes and Frantz, 2006; Hicken and Kuhota, 2011).

However, despite the scholarly interest in party and party system institutionalization, there has been little comparative work on the institutionalization of parties and party systems in Asia. Aside from Stockton’s (2001) study on how party system institutionalization affects the quality of democracy, and Hicken and Kuhota’s (2011) comparative analysis of fourteen Asian countries (which uses electoral volatility as proxy for party system institutionalization), most work on political parties in Asia is case-study based and only implicitly addresses the issue of party and party system institutionalization. These studies have highlighted the role of culture (Shin, 1995, 1999; Helgessen, 1998; Steinberg and Shin, 2006; Nakane, 1970) or institutions (Kohno, 1992; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010) in the development of Asian political parties. However, although these studies mention the predominance of particularism and the personal vote in East Asian democratic politics as an explanation for fragmented political parties, they do not seek to measure institutionalization of parties and the party system systematically.

Rather than looking at a single case, my research compares two third wave democracies in East Asia – Taiwan and South Korea. The two countries have many cultural, historical, and institutional similarities, but diverge on the level of party system institutionalization. While
Taiwan now has a highly institutionalized party system, with stable and predictable competition between two major parties, the Korean party system is still relatively weakly institutionalized.

Since we can hold many confounding variables largely constant, the most similar systems design (MSSD) can be applied to identify the key explanatory factors that account for the variation in party system institutionalization between the two countries. More specifically, similarities between the two countries in terms of the passage of time (both countries democratized around the same time), timing of competitive elections relative to the expansion of suffrage, culture (Confucian), electoral systems (mixed member FPTP), and character of economic development (based on export-orientated economic growth led by a strong state) found in both countries allows the effect of these explanatory variables on the dependent variable (party system institutionalization) to be largely controlled.

This study argues that the key explanatory variable for the variation in party system institutionalization is the contrasting legacies of authoritarian rule in Taiwan and South Korea. By comparing two cases, I demonstrate that the passage of time, timing of competitive elections relative to the expansion of suffrage, economic development, the electoral system and political culture, which are frequently cited as explanatory factors in the literature on party systems, are insufficient by themselves to explain variation in party system institutionalization. Instead, I argue that “history matters” – an understanding of the complex and multifaceted legacies of authoritarian rule is necessary to explain political development after democratization. Ironically, the dominance of the KMT party-state and its refusal to compromise on the one-China principle may have paved the way for the development of an institutionalized party system following democratization. In contrast, military regimes in South Korea did not allow the development of an institutionalized ruling party, while the dominance of Gyeongsang elites and discrimination against the Jeolla region heightened a centuries old regional antagonism. With the absence of any clear ideological or class-based cleavages, this regional antagonism became the defining feature of South Korean politics post-democratization, hampering the development of the party system.

However, we also observe variation in the institutionalization of individual parties within each country. The legacy of the authoritarian state has given each party different levels of access to financial and ideological resources. The interaction between these financial and ideological resources has led each party to adopt different mobilization strategies, producing varying levels of party institutionalization. In particular, despite coming from opposite ends of the political spectrum, the Saenuri Party (SP) in South Korea and DPP in Taiwan have shown greater levels of party institutionalization than their rivals. In the second party of this study, I therefore also develop a model that attempts to explain the variation in institutionalization between parties by examining each party’s access to financial and ideological resources. I argue that the highest level of party institutionalization occurs when abundant ideological resources are combined with scarce financial resources, since the party will adopt a dominant strategy of forming programmatic linkages with voters, as is the case with the DPP in Taiwan. In the case of the SP in South Korea, which enjoys both abundant ideological and financial resources,
institutionalization will be somewhat lower. This is because the party does not have a dominant strategy, and will typically combine programmatic and clientelist mobilization. In addition, the party’s greater access to financial resources is likely to produce greater factional divisions over control over these resources. In the case of the KMT, abundant financial resources are combined with scarce ideological resources, producing a dominant clientelist strategy. This strategy is associated with lower institutionalization because it is dependent on the maintenance of potentially unstable relations with clients. The DP in Korea combines both scarce ideological and financial resources, and therefore does not have programmatic or clientelist options open to it. The DP instead adopts a strategy of co-optation by recruiting outside actors, primarily civil society and labour union figures, into electoral alliances. As a result, the DP has the lowest level of institutionalization of the four parties studied.

In terms of financial resources, the legacy of the authoritarian period is crucial. Of the four parties, the KMT continues to enjoy the greatest access to resources as a legacy of its significant economic interests built up during the authoritarian period. Although the predecessors to the Saenuri Party, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) and the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) were subordinate to the military dictatorship and did not develop the party machinery or enormous wealth enjoyed by the KMT, the state-corporate alliance between the Chaebols and Park Chung-hee regime provided the basis for a steady supply of funding to the SP and its predecessors. In contrast, the DPP and DP both have very limited financial resources. The DPP only emerged as Taiwan began to transition to democracy, and has relied mostly on small-scale donations from party supporters for its funding. The roots of the DP can be traced back to the national opposition during the Park Chung-hee era, but the modern party is also similarly starved of financial resources.

To explain variations in ideological resources, external relations are crucial. The Republic of Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan were both the product of divided states that emerged following long and protracted civil wars against communism. During the authoritarian period, both states were defined by a fierce anti-communism that was used to justify repression of any internal opposition, whether it be explicitly socialist, or simply pro-democratic. On the international stage, both states were firmly embedded in the U.S. Asia-Pacific sphere as key allies in the regional fight against communism. Following democratization, a cleavage emerged in both countries (although it is much more heightened in Taiwan) between advocates of engagement with the former communist foe (the KMT and DP), and opponents of engagement (the SP and the DPP). The DPP and SP have both derived the ideological resources from a “defensive nationalism” against the threat from mainland China and North Korea and a general opposition to engagement. For instance, the highpoint of North-South Korea exchanges took place under Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” continued under Roh Moo-hyun, but was abandoned by the conservative Lee Myung-bak. In Taiwan, the opening has been led by the Kuomintang, which has engaged in semi-official party-to-party talks with the Chinese Communist Party and signed a major preferential trade agreement – the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) – with the mainland. In contrast, the DPP remains cautious about closer engagement with mainland China.
The extensive political science literature on party and party system institutionalization (Dix, 1992; Morlino, 1995; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring, 1999; Diamond and Gunther, 2001; Diamandouros and Gunther, 2001; Kostelecký, 2002; Mainwaring and Torca, 2006; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007) traces its roots back to Huntington’s argument that the “stability of a modernizing political system depends on the strength of its political parties” (Huntington, 1968: 408). The literature was initially focused on the relationship between party and party system institutionalization and the consolidation or deepening of democracy. Foweraker (1998) points out that in Latin American presidential–PR systems, the strength or weakness of party systems explains significant variations in governability. In countries and regions ranging from India (Kohli, 1992), post-communist Europe (Birch, 2001), Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring, 1999), and Africa (Manning, 2005) studies have shown that weakly institutionalized or unstable party systems are detrimental to democratic consolidation and democratic deepening. Morlino (1995: 145) identifies the key role played by parties (and party elites) in the democratic consolidation of Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. When democratic systems have restricted legitimacy, the role of parties in penetrating and controlling society is crucial for democratic consolidation (Morlino, 1995: 161).

Huntington (1968: 12) defined institutionalization as “the process by which organizations acquire value and stability.” He measured institutionalization along four dimensions: adaptability, coherence, complexity, and autonomy. These dimensions were adopted by Dix (1992) in his study of the institutionalization of Latin American political parties. Subsequently, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) (see also Mainwaring 1998, Mainwaring, 1999: 26-27 and Mainwaring and Torcal, 2005: 4-5) identified four dimensions of party system institutionalization. First, institutionalized party systems show more stable and predictable party competition. Second, in institutionalized party systems, parties have strong roots in society and voters show strong identification with parties. Links between parties and citizens are stable. Third, in institutionalized party systems, major political actors accord legitimacy to parties. They regard parties as essential to the democratic process, even where they are critical of individual parties or the party system in general. Finally, in institutionalized party systems, party organizations matter. Parties acquire independent value and statues; they are not subordinate to the interests and ambitions of their top leaders.

More recently, scholars have also attempted to identify the causes of both party and party system institutionalization. The first possible explanatory variable is simply the passage of time—institutions tend to stabilize as they get older. Converse (1969) put forward a model of the progressive freezing of a democratic system as a function of time. There is mixed support for this hypothesis in the literature. For example, Tavits’ (2005) pooled time-series cross-section data on election results from fifteen East European democracies finds that electoral volatility increases immediately after a regime change, while the trend is reversed after democracy has endured for about a decade. However, other studies find no link between the age of a democracy
and the stabilization of party competition (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). Another explanatory variable cited in the literature is timing. For instance, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007: 171) maintain that, instead of the age of the democratic regime, “the timing and sequence of the formation of democratic regimes and parties are critical explanatory variables.” They argue that citizens in new democracies are less attached to political parties. In old competitive regimes, parties helped create citizens and built electoral organizations to forge party-voter linkages. In contrast, in new democracies, parties have less incentive to engage in party building as they can win elections through the mass media and modern campaign techniques.

Another explanation for weak parties adopted by some Asia country specialists, but less accepted in the comparative literature, is the region’s Confucian cultural heritage. For instance, studies on Korea (Shin, 1995; 1999; Helgessen, 1998; Steinberg and Shin, 2006) and Japan (Nakane, 1970) have cited Confucian cultural heritage as an explanation for weak political parties and highly personalistic politics. According to Shin (1995: 49), “Traditional Confucian culture appears to hold the key to the slow growth of popular support for democratic political parties in Korea. In the Confucian world of politics, institutions such as political parties matter relatively little. What always matters most is the personal quality or moral righteousness of political office-holders.” However, Krauss and Pekkanen (2011: 103), writing on Japan, point out that cultural explanations assume bottom-up causality (i.e. society determining politics) and fail to account for possible top-down causes (i.e. the role of the state in politics). Cultural approaches also fail to explain differences across time and space. For instance, culture (which is assumed to be relatively static) cannot account for rapid changes in formal or informal political and social arrangements. Furthermore, the cultural approach cannot explain why societies with very different cultures have sustained similar political arrangements for a long period, or why societies with very similar cultures have very different political arrangements.

Economic factors may also contribute to party and party system institutionalization. There is substantial evidence in the political science literature for economic voting (Feldman, 1982; Markus, 1998; Pacek, 1994; Remmer 1991; Duch and Stevenson, 2008). A weak economy may increase voter volatility by undermining established political parties and weakening traditional loyalties as voters seek alternatives. On the other hand, a strong economy may solidify support for the status-quo, reducing electoral volatility. However, there may also be a curvilinear relationship between volatility and economic performance as economic success shifts voters towards the incumbent (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999: 577-578). Roberts and Wibbels (1999: 584) find that in Latin America, legislative elections are more vulnerable to economic fluctuations than presidential elections; in the latter neither GDP nor inflation have a statistically significant effect on volatility (although Roberts and Wibbels do find a statistically significant effect on incumbent vote share). In Eastern Europe, Tavits (2005) shows that economic shocks affect electoral stability, especially at the beginning of transition to a market economy.

Institutions may also affect political parties. Many scholars have argued that presidentialism can undermine party strength when compared to parliamentary regimes (Linz, 1994; Lijphart,
However, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) do not find any evidence for a link between party system volatility and presidentialism. When cultural explanations fell out of favour for explaining the Japanese party system, scholars explained the fragmented nature of Japanese parties as a function of the SNTV electoral system that was in place before 2003 (Kohno, 1992; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010). Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) argue that Japanese factions arose from the need to divide the vote evenly between different candidates from the same party. In addition, because candidates from the same party must compete against each other, the system undermines the legitimacy of political parties. According to Nemoto, Pekkanen, and Krauss (2012) the LDP was unable to solve its collective action problem in agreeing on the number of candidates to run in a district. Since the party leadership lacked control over nominations, self-interested figures in the party risked a loss of seats for the party (through over-nomination) by pursuing their own ambitions. The failure of the party leadership to control this problem led to the fundamental weakness of the LDP.

Scholars have also pointed to the effect of cleavages on electoral volatility. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) attributed the stability of Western European party systems to the institutionalization of cleavages based on class, religion, and nationality through partisan competition and the construction of mass party organization. Subsequently, scholars attributed increasing electoral volatility in the Western democracies to breakdown of traditional class cleavages (Inglehart, 1990; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). However, Bartolini and Mair (1990) have demonstrated that patterns of electoral competition in Western Europe have remained relatively stable in the face of societal change. In Latin America, despite sharp class cleavages and in some cases ethnic cleavages, with the exception of Chile and to a limited extent Argentina, party competition did not develop according to the Western model. As Dix (1989: 26) has pointed out, in Latin American party systems “single class parties (whether working class or bourgeois) have tended to be relatively peripheral, or mere adjuncts to party systems that instead revolve around an axis of one or more multiclass parties.” Catch-all parties across Latin America have utilized vertical patron-client ties to attract and mobilize electoral support (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt et al., 2010). Crosscutting ties may be associated with weaker party system institutionalization. For instance, Birnir (2007) finds that ethnically divided societies are more likely to produce strong parties and stable party competition. However, other studies have found no strong correlation between clientelism (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999) or political cleavages (Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011) and electoral volatility.

Another set of explanatory factors for party and party system institutionalization identified in the literature is the legacy of the authoritarian regime (Geddes and Frantz, 2007; Hicken and Kuhonta, 2011). For instance, Geddes and Frantz (2007) find that traditional parties survive longer when allied with dictatorships that prevent competing parties entering the political system for many decades. Furthermore, when authoritarian regimes repress or ban rival parties, after liberalization these same parties tend to re-emerge little changed. The old parties command substantial support from voters, while new parties struggle to attract voters. Therefore, dictatorship tends to stabilize existing party systems and reduce volatility. However,
when dictatorships also create new parties to support themselves (and provide token opposition), the existing party-system is destabilized. In addition, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011) find that party system institutionalization is more likely when the ruling party under the previous authoritarian regime was highly institutionalized. However, they also find that longer authoritarian interludes can be disruptive to party system institutionalization, particularly when the authoritarian regime creates a new party while supressing existing parties.

Overall, the literature has identified a large number of explanatory variables and enhanced our understanding of how institutionalized parties and party systems emerge. However, there are number of shortcomings in the literature. First, in terms of geographical scope, the literature was initially largely focused on parties and party systems in the Western democracies, and paid little attention to the developing world. Subsequently, United States based scholars shifted attention to party systems in Latin America. However, for whatever reason, comparativists working on party systems have largely ignored other regions, including Asia. Third, while Dix (1992) focused on the institutionalization of specific political parties, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) subsequently switched the focus to party systems rather than individual parties. In addition, much of the literature fails to distinguish “party institutionalization” and “party system institutionalization.” This study attempts to resolve this shortcoming by measuring both concepts separately.

**Cross-Country Comparison**

When comparing countries, the researcher often faces the problem of “too many variables and not enough countries” (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Lijphart, 1971, 1975; King, 1994), making it difficult to draw causal inferences about the relationship between variables. One solution is to increase the number of cases so that statistical inferences can be drawn. The vast majority of the literature on party system institutionalization has adopted this statistical approach. An alternative approach is to match similar cases so that we can identify the relevant explanatory variables that account for the variation on the dependent variable in each of the cases. This approach, adapted from Mill’s method of difference, is most commonly referred to as the “most similar systems design” (MSSD) (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 32; Lipset, 1975, 164). By matching cases, we can control for the effect of omitted variables on the dependent variable.

When using MSSD, it is important to identify cases that can be “matched” across as many variables as possible to isolate the independent variables that explain the variance on the dependent variable. Due to their similarities in economic development, political culture, electoral institutions, and some aspects of the authoritarian legacy, Taiwan and South Korea are ideal cases for application of MSSD (Table 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Character of economic development</td>
<td>Export-orientated economic development</td>
<td>Export-orientated economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political culture</td>
<td>Confucian legacy, replacement of authoritarian values with modern and participant values, emergence of strong civil society</td>
<td>Confucian legacy, replacement of authoritarian values with modern and participant values, emergence of strong civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of democratization</td>
<td>First democratic presidential election in 1996</td>
<td>First democratic presidential election in 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral institutions</td>
<td>Mixed system: FPTP and PR (SNTV abolished)</td>
<td>Mixed system: FPTP and PR (SNTV abolished)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian legacy</td>
<td>Strong state, (post) developmental state, labour repression, institutionalized party-state, cross-Strait relations</td>
<td>Strong state, (post) developmental state, labour repression, weakly institutionalized military rule, regionalism, inter-Korean relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>High party system institutionalization</td>
<td>Low party system institutionalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the study, economic development, political culture, the timing of democratization, electoral institutions, and certain aspects of the authoritarian legacy are controlled using MSSD. Variation on the dependent variable is explained using two aspects of the authoritarian legacy that differ between the two cases. First, the legacy of the institutionalized party-state in Taiwan contrasted to weakly institutionalized military rule in South Korea. Second, following democratization, South Korea and Taiwan were left facing very different external challenges. While South Korea attained economic and military dominance over its isolated neighbour, Taiwan was left vulnerable from the growing economic and military threat from mainland China. Taiwan’s weaker position produced a sharp national identity cleavage, which was conducive to the institutionalization of its party system.

The use of the MSSD to compare a few countries offers some important advantages over large-N studies of many countries. Intensive comparison of only two cases avoids problems such as the availability of data and reliability of measures that plague large-N studies. In particular, by intensive comparison of only two cases, we are able to look at party institutionalization across multiple dimensions, rather than limiting ourself to measuring volatility as a proxy for party
system institutionalization. However, comparing a small number of countries also has a number of disadvantages. Przeworski and Teune (1970) argue that MSSD produces “overdetermined” outcomes because rival explanations can never be completely ruled out. The problem of overdetermined outcomes can be reduced, but not eliminated, by maximizing the “the ratio between the amount of variance of the operative variables and the amount of variance of the control variables, which is assumed to be zero, but is essentially uncontrolled.” This is achieved by minimizing the variance of the control variables and by maximizing that of the independent and dependent variables.” (Lijphart, 1975: 163-164). Another potential problem in small-N studies is selection bias, since our two cases may not be indicative of the whole universe of cases (Geddes, 1991). While we acknowledge this issue, it is minimized somewhat by the fact that our two cases cover opposite ends of the scale in terms of outcome.

**Comparing Parties**

To explain party institutionalization, we explore how the legacy of the authoritarian period has influenced each party individually. Specifically, we look at how the authoritarian legacy has given the two major parties in each country varying access to financial and ideological resources. In both cases, the ruling party (or its successor) from the authoritarian period has the greatest access to financial resources, either due to direct control of party-state assets (in the case of the KMT) or alliances with economically powerful chaebols (in the case of the SP). Ideological resources are accrued from a mobilization of “defensive nationalism” in response to the “threat” from mainland China and North Korea. Since the DPP in Taiwan and the SP in South Korea have a more hostile stance towards their communist neighbors, we assume that these two parties will have greater access to ideological resources.

The interaction of access to financial and ideological resources produces different strategies, as shown in Figure 1, below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Resources</th>
<th>Abundant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scarce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP (民主黨)</td>
<td>KMT(國民黨)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coptation</td>
<td>Clientlist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological Resources</th>
<th></th>
<th>Abundant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scarce</td>
<td>DPP (民進黨)</td>
<td>SP(新世界黨)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programatic</td>
<td>Programatic-Clientist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The different strategies adopted by the parties dependent on their access to financial and ideological resources are expected to produce different levels of party institutionalization, as shown in Figure 2, below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial resources/ideological resources</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scarce/abundant (DPP)</td>
<td>Dominant programatic strategy</td>
<td>Programatic linkages strengthen party institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abundant/abundant (SP)</td>
<td>Mixed clientelist/programatic strategy</td>
<td>Programatic linkages strengthen party institutionalization, clientelism undermines party institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abundant/scarce (KMT)</td>
<td>Dominant clientelis strategy</td>
<td>Clientelism undermines party institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarce/scarce (DP)</td>
<td>Cooptation strategy</td>
<td>Party is dependent on cooptation/alliances with outside groups, least institutionalized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Constructing an Index of Party and Party System Institutionalization**

First, it is necessary to clarify the concepts of “party institutionalization” and “party system institutionalization.” The framework adopted by this study is based on Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) four dimensions of party system institutionalization (stable and predicable competition, strong roots in society, major actors accord legitimacy to parties, and party organizations matter). Although Mainwaring and Scully talk about party system institutionalization rather than party institutionalization, their indicators are closely related to the individual features of parties (Yardmcı-Geyikçi, 2013). Therefore, the model can be applied both on the macro level to the party system as a whole and on the meso level to individual parties.

A major shortcoming of the existing literature is a lack of operationalized variables to measure party or party system institutionalization (Yardmcı-Geyikçi, 2013). As a result, scholars have frequently simply used volatility as a proxy for party system institutionalization (see for example Hicken and Kuhota, 2011). However, volatility does not tell us anything about the
development of party organizations; it only tells us about the links between parties and citizens. Therefore, we propose revisions to Mainwaring and Scully’s index to enable us to more effectively capture more facers of party and party system institutionalization. We combine Mainwaring and Scully’s first two dimensions into a single “linkages between parties and voters” dimension, and their second two dimensions into a single “organizational development of parties” dimension. Next, we propose two indicators for each of the two dimensions that are relatively straightforward to operationalize and measure. For the first dimension, we look at electoral volatility, the electoral performance of independents, and party identification, which can be easily measured using readily accessible quantitative data. For the second dimension, we look at whether the parties have a nationwide organization and party membership levels. After these revisions, we are left with the framework shown in Table 1, below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Index of Party and Party System Institutionalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkages between parties and voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational development of parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first indicator of party-voter linkages is party competition. In an institutionalized party system, we expect that party competition is generally predictable and stable (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Large swings between elections indicate that party loyalties are weakly institutionalized. Conversely, low levels of volatility indicate stable and predictable party loyalties (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Furthermore, we expect that strong party-voter linkages will be reflected in higher levels of party identification. For the organizational development of parties, we first look at whether the party has strong nationwide organization across the country. To measure this, we use the regional distribution of votes as a proxy. If a party can perform consistently well across the country, this indicates that it has strong nationwide organization. However, if a party performs unevenly across the country, this indicates that their party organization is much stronger in some areas. Second, we look at the membership strength and membership density of political parties.

**Measuring Party and Party System Institutionalization in South Korea and Taiwan**

First, we measure electoral volatility using results from constituency elections (SNTV and FPTP) for comparison, as separate party list elections were only held in South Korea after 2004 and Taiwan after 2008. Electoral volatility refers to the aggregate turnover between different parties from one election to the next (Bartolini and Mair, Tavits, 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007), measured using the Pedersen Index (Pedersen, 1979, 1983). Volatility reflects both vote switching across parties as well as elite-driven changes such as party mergers and splits (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Powell and Tucker, 2013). Table 3 shows volatility in constituency elections in Taiwan, and South Korea. In Taiwan, volatility is calculated from the
first full re-election of the Executive Yuan in 1992, and includes elections held under both SNTV (1992-2004) and FPTP (after 2008). In South Korea volatility is calculated from the first election after the introduction of electoral reform in 1988 that abolished SNTV and introduced single member constituencies.

Taiwan’s electoral volatility for legislative elections between 1992-2012 is 16.33, significantly lower than the figure for Korea between 1998-2012. Taiwan’s relatively low electoral volatility was achieved under an SNTV system before the 2005 reform, despite the fact that this electoral system creates strong incentives to cultivate a personal vote and produces uncertainty in party nomination strategies, which is likely to weaken the electoral cohesiveness of political parties and increase electoral volatility (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; Bawn, Cox, and Rosenbluth, 1999; Tien and Cheng, 1999). After 1995, electoral volatility in Taiwan has remained at around ten points or less for each electoral cycle, with the exceptions of the 2001 election when James Soong’s newly established People’s First Party secured in excess of 20% of the vote, and 2008 when the third parties lost substantial vote share after the introduction of the FPTP mixed-member system.

In contrast, volatility in South Korean elections has been consistently high. Before the 2012 election, volatility only dipped below 20 points on one occasion (the 2004) election. Much of the volatility in South Korea is elite driven – caused by a bewildering array of party ruptures and mergers. This pattern of frequent splits, mergers, and name changes has been particularly prominent on the progressive side of the political divide. In addition, unlike in Taiwan, labour-based parties have managed to attract some degree of electoral support, further complicating party politics.

Table 4: Electoral Volatility in Taiwan and South Korea for Constituency Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elections included</th>
<th>Mean Volatility</th>
<th>Most Recent Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1992-2012</td>
<td>16.33</td>
<td>8.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1988-2012</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>11.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own calculations. Election data from Central Election Commission, Taiwan: http://www.cec.gov.tw/; National Election Commission, South Korea: http://www.nec.go.kr/

We also measure volatility for presidential elections in Taiwan and South Korea, shown in Table 4. In both countries, volatility is calculated from the founding presidential election (1987 for South Korea and 1996 for Taiwan). Although electoral volatility in Taiwan over the period is not significantly higher than South Korea, Taiwan has seen a marked decline in volatility from the 1996 and 2000 elections, when independent candidates, most notably James Soong in 2000, but also Lin Yang-kang and Chen Li-an in 1996, captured significant vote shares. Volatility dropped to under nine points in the 2008 election, and to under seven points in the 2012 election as the two major parties solidified their electoral bases. President Ma Ying-jeou’s
low popularity, which had plummeted to a low of 16% in the wake of Typhoon Morokot, failed to persuade a significant number of votes to shift their support to Tsai Ing-wen – DPP support in 2012 was only 4% higher than the party’s 2008 performance. At the same time, voters appear to have realised that under the winner-takes-all presidential elections, a vote for a third party candidate is wasted. In the final days of the election campaign, Soong supporters shifted allegiance to Ma in large numbers. The “abandon Soong, protect Ma” effect left the PFP leader with less than 3% of the vote.

In contrast, presidential elections in South Korea remain volatile. While the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) has secured at least 45% of the vote in the last three elections, helped by high support in the Yeongnam region and an electoral base of mostly elderly, conservative voters concerned about the North Korea threat, support for the main progressive party has fluctuated significantly. In 2002, Roh Moo-hyun won the presidency with nearly 49% of the popular vote thanks to the support of the left-leaning “386 generation” (those voters in their 30s who entered university in the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s). However, five years later this coalition had collapsed as voters blamed the Roh administration for economic slowdown and rising unemployment. In 2007, the progressive candidate Chung Dong-young was left with just 26.1% of the vote, a drop in over 20% from Roh’s 2002 performance. In 2012, independent candidate Ahn Cheol-soo was consistently outpolling Democratic United Party candidate Moon Jae-in before he eventually withdrew from the race less than a month before the election after the two sides failed to agree on the format for selection of a joint candidate. The DUP remains divided sharply between the pro-Roh faction and the “Honam Wing” loyal to Kim Dae-jung and seen as closer to Ahn, who enjoyed significant support in the region.

Table 4: Electoral Volatility in Taiwan and South Korea for Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elections included</th>
<th>Mean Volatility</th>
<th>Most Recent Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1996-2012</td>
<td>22.04</td>
<td>6.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1988-2012</td>
<td>26.81</td>
<td>25.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tables 5 and 6 break down electoral volatility scores for political parties in Taiwan and South Korea. For legislative elections, as expected, the two parties with the least access to ideological resources (the KMT and DP) showed the greatest levels of volatility. However, contrary to our expectations, financial resources did not influence the level of volatility. In fact, the KMT showed somewhat higher levels of volatility than the DP over the period, while the levels of volatility shown by the DPP and SP were virtually identical.

Table 4: Electoral Volatility in Taiwan and South Korea for Constituency Elections by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elections included</th>
<th>Mean Volatility</th>
<th>Most Recent Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>1992-2012</td>
<td>10.62</td>
<td>13.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1988-2012</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>8.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For presidential elections, as expected, the DP and the KMT showed the highest levels of volatility. Volatility in the votes of these two parties was significantly greater than for the SP. However, volatility in the DPP vote share was nearly as high as the DP and KMT. This apparent anomaly can be accounted for by the fact the DPP started from a very low base, rapidly increasing its vote share from the 21% won by Peng Ming-min in 1996 to Chen Shui-bian’s 39% in 2000 and 50% in 2004. Since 2004, the DPP’s vote share has remained remarkably stable, despite the dramatic fall in Chen Shui-bian’s popularity in his second term and the damage caused to the party by corruption allegations against Chen.

Table 6: Electoral Volatility in Taiwan and South Korea for Presidential Elections by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Elections included</th>
<th>Mean Volatility</th>
<th>Most Recent Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>1996-2012</td>
<td>13.29</td>
<td>21.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>1996-2012</td>
<td>11.40</td>
<td>6.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>1987-2012</td>
<td>10.39</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>1987-2012</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>2.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our second measure of party and party system institutionalization is identification with political parties. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) measures party attachment by asking respondents if they are close to any political party. For the most recent data from Taiwan, we also use the 2012 Taiwan Election and Democratization Survey (TEDS). Figure 1 shows that party identity has steadily strengthened in Taiwan, while it has stagnated in South Korea. The proportion of respondents who stated they were close to a political party increased from 34% in the CSES first wave, to 46% in the second wave, 51% in the third wave, and 56% in the TEDS 2012 survey. In South Korea, party identification increased from 27% in the first wave to 40% in the second wave, but in the third wave, it remained at the same level.

Figure 1 Party Identification in Taiwan, South Korea
We also look at party identification by generation. We identify two separate generations, those born before and after 1975. The generation born in 1975 graduated from elementary school in 1987, the same year that South Korea held its first democratic presidential election and Chiang Ching-kuo announced the lifting of martial law in Taiwan. While the pre-1975 generation underwent their political socialization under authoritarian rule, the post-1975 generation were socialized under democracy. Therefore, we are interested if there is any variation in party identification between the generations. Assuming partisan attachment increases as an individual gets older, as predicted by the life-cycle explanation (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1976), if we find little difference between party identification between the two age cohorts, we can reasonably expect that overall party loyalties will further strengthen in the future as the younger generation gets older. However, if we find that partisan attachment among the younger generation is significantly weaker than the older generation, it is likely that party identification will not significantly strengthen in the future, as the life cycle effect will only be sufficient to increase party identification among the younger generation to the same level as the older counterparts.

Figures 2 and 3 below show levels of partisan attachments for the two generations for each of the three waves of the CSES and the TEDS 2012. For each wave of the survey, the generational difference in South Korea is much larger than in Taiwan. In 2000, only 16% of the post-1975 generation in South Korea identified with a political party, compared to 29% of their pre-1975 counterparts. Although the generational gap has narrowed over time, in 2008 partisan attachment among the post-1975 generation in South Korea was still 11% higher than the pre-1975 generation. In contrast, the gap in partisan generations in Taiwan declined from 9% in 1996 to only 3% in 2001, before increasingly slightly to 5% in both 2008 and 2012. In terms
of absolute figures, the level of partisan attachment in 2008 among the pre-1975 generation in Taiwan was 48%, 15% higher than for the same generation in South Korea. Therefore, we can expect that, assuming the life cycle effect is constant in the two countries, partisan attachment in Taiwan will increase at a much faster rate than South Korea in the future.

Figure 2 Party Identification in Taiwan by Generation

![Graph showing party identification in Taiwan by generation from 1996 to 2012.]


Figure 3 Party Identification in South Korea by Generation

![Graph showing party identification in South Korea by generation from 2000 to 2008.]


In the 2008 CSES survey, respondents who stated they were close to a political party were also asked which party they felt closest too. The DPP showed the strongest levels of party identification, with 35% of respondents in Taiwan stating they were close to the party. Levels of party identification for the KMT and the Grand National Party (GNP, the predecessor to the Saenuri Party) were nearly identical and 28% and 29% respectively. However, the percentage of respondents identifying with the United Democratic Party (UNDP, the predecessor to the Democratic Party) was only 11% (Figure 4 and Figure 5). Furthermore, respondents in South Korea were far more likely (18%) to identify with third parties than respondents in Taiwan (3%).
Figure 4 Percentage of Respondents who Stated they were Close to a Given Political Party, Taiwan


Figure 5 Percentage of Respondents who Stated they Were Close to a Given Political Party, South Korea

In addition to examining the strength of party identification among the electorate as a whole, we also examine the ratio between party identification and vote share in the 2007 (South Korea) and 2008 (Taiwan) presidential elections. A higher ratio indicates that more candidates are motivated to cast their vote for the party out of party loyalty, while a lower ratio suggests other motivations are at work. The ratio of DPP party identification (34.75%) to vote share (41.55%) was 0.84, significantly higher than for any of the other parties, indicating that DPP voters are overwhelmingly motivated by party loyalty. In sharp contrast, the ratio between UNDP party identification (11.13%) in 2008 and the party’s vote share in the 2007 presidential election (26.17%) was only 0.43. This finding suggests that even after the collapse of the party’s vote in 2007, party identification among the party’s remaining voters was still low. Finally, the ratio of party identification to party vote share was higher for the GNP (0.59) when compared to the KMT (0.48), indicating the party-voter linkage is stronger among GNP supporters.

Figure 6 Ratio of Party Identification to Party Vote Share in Taiwan and South Korea


Next, we turn to the institutionalization of party organization. Our first measure is party membership, which includes only party members who have paid their party dues. Table 6 shows that in terms of raw numbers the KMT has the most members, followed by the SP, DPP, and DP. However, when we look at membership density – the ratio of party members to voters (M/V ratio), we find that the penetration of party organization into the electorate is much more extensive in Taiwan. In particular, KMT fees-paying members still account for more than 2%
of eligible voters in Taiwan, an important legacy of the authoritarian period then the party sought to expand its party membership to strengthen its political base on Taiwan. Overall, around 3% of votes in Taiwan are members of one of the two major parties, compared to around 0.8% in South Korea.

Table 6 Membership of Four Major Parties in Taiwan and South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Party Membership</th>
<th>M/V ratio</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>381,548</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>*2013 party chairman election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>163,648</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
<td>*2012 party chairman election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>202,722</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>*2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>117,634</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>*2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Our second measure of party organization is the presence of a nationwide organization. In this paper, we use the distribution of national vote share as a proxy for nationwide organization. If a party’s vote is fairly evenly distributed across the country, this indicates that the party has a nationwide organizational presence that can mobilize voters nationwide. However, vote distribution that is skewed toward certain regions indicates that the party is only able to mobilize voters in all parts of the country. Figure 7, below, shows the distribution of votes in each constituency for the four major parties in the 2008 legislative elections. Each cross represents that party’s vote share in a single constituency. As is clear from the figure, Taiwan’s two major parties were competitive across the whole county. For instance, the lowest KMT vote share was 37%, while its highest share was less than 72%. Aside from the sparsely populated counties of Hualien and Taitung, and the outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu, the DPP vote share was at least 25%. However, the DPP failed to pass 60% vote share in any constituency. In stark contrast, the GNP vote ranged from a maximum 88.58% won by Park Geun-hye Dalseong-Gun, Daegu Metropolitan City to just 2.13% won in Mokpo, South Jeolla. The UDP vote was also distributed over a wide range, from in 88.74% in Dong-gu, Gwangju, to just 3.27% in Dong-gu and Nam-gu, Daegu. In total, the UDP failed to reach 10% of the vote share in thirteen constituencies, and did not nominate a candidate in a further 46 constituencies.

Figure 7 Distribution of Party Vote Shares by Constituency, 2008 Legislative Election
In terms of our national comparison between party systems, on each of our measures, it is clear that institutionalization has proceeded more quickly in Taiwan than South Korea. Overall, Taiwan has lower voter volatility, higher levels of party identification, higher levels of party membership, and stronger nationwide party organizations. However, the findings for institutionalization of individual parties is less conclusive. While, as expected, the KMT and DP showed higher volatility in vote share than their rivals, unexpectedly, DPP volatility was significantly higher than for the GP. In terms of party identification (measured both in absolute terms and as a proportion of party vote share), our findings were in line with our expectations, with the DPP enjoying the highest levels of party identification, followed by, in order, the SP, KMT, and DP. In terms of party membership, while the figures for the DPP, SP, and DP are in line with expectations, the KMT has much higher levels of membership than any other party. This is a persistent legacy of the authoritarian period when the KMT actively co-opted certain sections of society into the party. Finally, both Korean parties have failed to develop a genuinely nationwide organization and regularly score vote shares in the single figures in their opponent’s heartlands. On this measure, the institutionalization of South Korean parties lags significantly behind their counterparts in Taiwan.

**Conclusion**

Overall, the results of the study largely met our expectations. As expected, on all four measures, Taiwan has significantly higher levels of party system institutionalization than South Korea. In the twenty-seven years since the DPP was established, and little more than twenty years since national elections were restored, Taiwan has developed a remarkably stable two-party system,
with low levels of electoral volatility and strong party identification. In contrast to its neighbours and the established Western democracies, young people in Taiwan have levels of partisan attachment comparable to the older generation. Furthermore, the current trends in electoral volatility and partisan attachment indicate that the party system will continue to further strengthen in the future. In contrast political parties in South Korea are weakly institutionalized, voters show low levels of identification with parties, and elections remain volatile. We found that commonly cited explanatory factors in party system institutionalization, including the age of democratic institutions and the timing of democratization, culture, economic factors, and the system of government and electoral system do not vary significantly between the two countries. Instead, the authoritarian legacy offers a more compelling explanation for variations in party system institutionalization.

Furthermore, we found that the authoritarian legacy impacts different parties in different ways. We present a model where parties are endowed with different levels of ideological and financial resources. We expect that institutionalization will be highest when abundant ideological resources are combined with scarce financial resources, since parties will be compelled to adopt a dominant programmatic strategy (DPP). The second highest level of institutionalization is when abundant ideological resources are combined with abundant financial resources. In this case the party will adopt a mixed clientelist/programatic strategy (SP). The third highest level of institutionalization occurs when scarce ideological resources are combined with abundant financial resources. In this case, the party will choose a dominant clientlist strategy (KMT). Finally, the lowest level of institutionalization occurs when scarce ideological resources are combined with scarce financial resources. In this case, the party will be compelled to seek unstable alliances with outside actors (DP). Our four measures of party institutionalization lend some support to this argument, although further refinement of the model is still required.
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